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Abstract— A Personal Network is a self-organizing, secure and 
private network of a user’s devices notwithstanding their 
geographic location.  It aims to utilize pervasive computing to 
provide users with new and improved services. In this paper we 
propose a model for securing Personal Network clusters. Clusters 
are ad-hoc networks of co-located personal devices. The ad-hoc 
makeup of clusters, coupled with the resource constrained nature 
of many constituent devices, makes enforcing security a 
challenging task.  
We propose a novel way of imprinting personal devices and pre-
deploying tickets for future authentication. Our key management 
framework is based on a combination of existing models, albeit 
modified to match the constraints and assets of Personal 
Networks. The mechanisms for self organization are original 
since they need to be tailored to our proposed security 
framework. All models are designed to be suitable for resource 
constrained devices yet robust enough for self organization and 
secure communication.  
Keywords- Personal Networks; security; constrained devices; 
symmetric cryptography; key management; self organization 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
A Personal Network (PN) [1] [4], is a paradigm that 
utilizes pervasive computing to provide its users with new and 
improved services. A PN comprises a core consisting of a PAN 
(Personal Area Network) which can be transparently extended 
to include other devices belonging to the user, both in his 
vicinity and those at remote locations. PNs are composed of 
heterogeneous personal devices and are dynamic entities due to 
the mobile nature of their constituents.  
Figure 1 outlines the network layer PN architecture 
envisioned in the QoS for PN@Home project [2]. Personal 
devices initially organize themselves in the form of clusters. 
Clusters are ad-hoc networks of personal devices that can 
communicate amongst each other without using any non-
personal devices. One can think of a cluster as a secured 
network of co-located personal devices. Forming clusters 
facilitates in securing multi-hop communication and access to 
the common pool of resources. The otherwise isolated clusters 
are interconnected using secure dynamic tunnels, created 
between gateway devices, resulting in a network of personal 
devices that are geographically dispersed.  In this work we 
focus on securing clusters in which constrained mobile devices 
communicate over unreliable channels, such as short range 
radio links. When communication occurs over reliable channels 
such as wired Ethernet, security can be enforced using simpler 
techniques such as firewalls at network entry points. 
 
Figure 1.  An instance of a Personal Network (PN)  
We envision a PN to contain a wide range of device types, 
from resource constrained sensors that must last months on a 
pair of AA batteries, to powerful devices like laptops and 
PDAs that are recharged often. The main challenge in securing 
PNs is in using mechanisms that are suitable for resource 
constrained devices yet robust enough for secure 
communication and self organization. This work focuses on 
securing constrained devices since any mechanism suitable for 
them will also function with more powerful devices.  
We begin in Section II by examining the limitations 
imposed on our design by constrained personal devices. 
Section III presents related works, some of which are based on 
similar requirements.  In Section IV we give an overview of 
our architectural framework where we introduce components 
used in our security model. Section V presents insight on how 
personal devices self-organize. Section VI gives an overview of 
our security model and Section VII presents the associated 
mechanisms in detail.  Section VIII analyses the possible 
attacks on our security model and Section IX concludes the 
paper with a summary of our contribution. 
II. CONSTRAINED DEVICES 
Designing a security framework for constrained devices has 
generally been problematic especially since attackers have 
none of these constraints. Personal devices such as cameras, 
Bluetooth headsets, biomedical sensors, wrist watches, belt 
computers etc. may be constrained in their: 
• Energy: Many personal devices are designed to be 
mobile. Their small batteries need to last months 
without recharging or replacement. We consider 
energy to be the scarcest resource in our system and 
our security mechanisms must be frugal in their power 
consumption. 
• Processing Power: Processing abilities are extremely 
limited, in line with the constraints imposed on their 
power usage. A typical example of a constrained 
personal device is that of a Berkeley Mica Mote 
sensor. It features an 8-bit 4 MHz Atmel ATmega 
128L processor with 128 Kbytes program store, and 4 
Kbytes SRAM. The processor only supports a minimal 
instruction set, without support for multiplication or 
variable-length shifts or rotates. 
• Storage space: A limited storage space means that only 
a limited number of cryptographic keys can be stored 
in the device. Also, any proposed security framework 
must be compact in its implementation. 
• User Interface: Some devices may only present their 
users with a few buttons and possibly a LED for 
indicating their state e.g. sensors, wireless headsets, 
cameras etc. Our design cannot make any assumptions 
about minimum user interface requirements. 
• Cost: Finally, the cost of a device will likely play a 
critical role in its success. Any cost overhead of 
security must be proportional to its benefit. 
In view of these constraints, the remainder of the paper will 
present details on our proposed mechanisms for key 
management and self organization in PNs. 
A. Symmetric or Asymmetric cryptography 
Carman et al. acknowledge in [13] that although security 
solutions based on symmetric key cryptography are attractive 
due to their low energy and processing requirements, they also 
have limitations. For instance, two well known security 
protocols SNEP [6] and TESLA [10] provide secure broadcast 
authentication using symmetric cryptography by delaying the 
disclosure of authenticable secret keys. Emulating asymmetry 
thus requires that each device is time synchronized with the 
sender, performs key management functions and has sufficient 
buffer capacity. Key management (requiring broadcasts) uses 
energy. If the number of messages being authenticated in each 
time period is large, the receiver also needs to have sufficient 
buffer capacity to store them before the corresponding key is 
released and they can be authenticated. 
Using public key cryptography instead would simplify 
protocols, since only the public key of the certification 
authority would have to be embedded into the devices and they 
could perform mutual authentication using signed certificates. 
Unfortunately, in the context of constrained devices the 
challenge with public key cryptography is to overcome the 
considerable computational complexity of asymmetric 
algorithms. Recent advances in efficient elliptic curve based 
algorithms such as EC-DH and EC-DSA show that it is 
computationally possible to use ECC based solutions in 
constrained devices like sensors [11] [12]. However they suffer 
from increased energy usage due to increased computational 
complexity and higher transmission costs as a result of 
transferring certificates and digital signatures. Ultimately, 
without a minimum capability criterion for constrained 
personal devices (and the cost of including public key 
cryptography for the single purpose of key establishment) we 
have concluded that our security mechanisms must only rely on 
lightweight symmetric cryptographic primitives. As a result we 
must also reject mechanisms based on the Diffie-Hellman 
protocol. 
In summary, our aim is to develop a security framework for 
PNs based solely on symmetric cryptographic primitives. 
Where possible we will use or modify existing well established 
security models that utilize the inherent assets of PNs, 
principally that personal devices fall under one administrative 
domain and that the heterogeneity of device types allows us to 
delegate tasking requiring larger resources to more able 
devices. 
III. RELATED WORK 
The work presented in this paper is a continuation of [3] 
where we presented general ideas of a security framework for 
PNs. Our aim was to use secure but lightweight mechanisms 
suitable for resource constrained devices and wireless 
communication. We proposed pair-wise keys for secure cluster 
formation and symmetric group keys for securing intra-cluster 
communication. Although the amount of overlapping material 
with this work is nominal, [3] does serve to put some of the 
issues we present here in a broader context. Note that since our 
proposals for self organization need to be tailored to our 
proposed architecture, the remainder of this section looks at 
related work only in the context of key management among 
constrained devices. 
A large part of the research done in the field of key 
management among constrained devices has focused on sensor 
networks [6] [16] [17]. Although some devices in our network 
are similarly constrained, key management in PNs presents a 
different set of requirements due to the dynamic nature of the 
network (personal devices are mobile and so clusters are 
dynamic and often transient), the heterogeneity of personal 
devices (from wrist watches to laptop computers) and the 
difference in size and scope. When compared to the typically 
large and unattended sensor network, lost/compromised 
devices in a PN are easier to detect and subsequently blacklist. 
Nevertheless many of the conclusions drawn from research in 
securing sensor networks [5], particularly on the suitability of 
specific cryptographic algorithms [15] are directly relevant. 
The constrained energy and communication capabilities of 
large sensor networks meant that protocols such as TLS and 
Kerberos (originally developed for wired networks) were 
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deemed impractical. Most current approaches use some 
variation of pre-deploying symmetric keys. Amongst common 
proposals are those that use a global key shared by all nodes 
[18] [13], those in which every node shares a secret key with a 
base station [6], and those based on random key sharing [17]. 
Also relevant are models and protocols (based on 
symmetric cryptography) designed for securing collaborative 
multicast communities [10] [14] and other long term 
communities [7] [9]. These form the building blocks of our 
proposed security framework for PNs and we will look at each 
of them in more detail later in this paper. 
To the best of our knowledge, the only other security 
architecture designed specifically for PNs is in the MAGNET 
project [4]. As such it is the only related work with which we 
can make a thorough comparison. Unlike our centralized 
approach to cluster formation, MAGNET devices wanting to 
join a cluster require a security association with at least one 
neighboring clustered device. However devices eventually need 
to establish separate security associations with all neighboring 
devices, something that results in increased communication 
overhead. Furthermore the use of pair-wise keys to secure both 
unicast and broadcast traffic increases processing overhead 
because of repeated decryption and re-encryption for packets 
traveling multiple hops. Our approach of using a group key 
reduces the overhead of key management and the centralized 
nature of our security architecture can be viewed as an asset as 
it provides the user with a higher degree of control. 
IV. ARCHITECTURAL FRAMEWORK 
Our aim is to establish a line of defense between the PN 
and the outside world, so it can be a truly personal network. 
Since devices belonging to a cluster are (by its very definition) 
connected and long-term connectivity between various clusters 
of a PN is not feasible, our security mechanisms are based on a 
separation of trust at the cluster level.  
A. Security Manager 
A security manager is the cyber-representative of the user 
within the PN. Each new device needs to be associated with the 
security manager before it can become part of the PN. 
Consequently the security manager maintains a database of 
secret keys, one for each personal device. This allows it to 
perform certain management tasks; such as configuring access 
rights, blacklisting devices, etc. As the controlling entity for all 
personal devices, it is important that the user maintains a 
backup of its secret keys. In case the security manager breaks 
down, they can be restored to a new device. However if the 
security manager gets lost or compromised, these keys can be 
used to quickly and easily re-imprint all devices with a new 
security manager. 
B. Security Agents 
Security within the cluster is managed by a device with the 
role of a security agent. A cluster can have only one security 
agent at a time; however the device acting as a security agent 
may also have other roles related to e.g. service discovery. 
Along with other management tasks, the security agent is 
responsible for advertising its cluster, authenticating new 
cluster members and initiating group key updates. Furthermore, 
in order to reduce risk from cryptanalytic attack, the security 
agent updates the cluster key from time to time. Section VII.D 
will look at the re-keying mechanism in more detail. 
Security agents periodically broadcast cluster 
advertisements, containing the PN ID and the security agent 
ID. The PN ID is a random value assigned to a PN when it is 
first created and is used by devices to distinguish 
advertisements belonging to their own PN from others. In order 
to reduce the possibility of ID collisions the PD ID should be 
calculated randomly over a sufficiently large space. Other 
cluster members may1 rebroadcast non-duplicate 
advertisements, in effect reaching outside devices within the 
range of even peripheral cluster members. These 
advertisements serve a dual purpose; they update cluster 
members to the presence of their security agent and also allow 
outside devices to discover the cluster. 
Using a multicast tree for broadcasting large number of 
messages to devices in an ad hoc network is more efficient than 
blind flooding [26], since it ensure that each device receives the 
message only once. However since constructing and 
maintaining such a delivery infrastructure has an overhead, 
further work is required to evaluate their suitability for 
disseminating cluster advertisements. This is especially true 
because unlike a typical multicast delivery tree where messages 
are only meant for tree members, cluster advertisements are 
also meant for outside devices that may wish to become 
members. Since we wish clusters to extend with devices that 
are within the range of even peripheral cluster members, our 
broadcast routing protocol should be optimized for peripheral 
members advertising. Consequently, at the moment we use 
blind flooding due to its simplicity, robustness and the fact that 
it gives us an idea of the worst case overhead for disseminating 
cluster advertisements.  
If outside devices hearing cluster advertisements are un-
clustered and belong to the same PN, they authenticate with the 
security agent of the cluster through the advertising device. To 
that end, cluster members enable IEEE 802.1X based port 
authentication. Since clustered devices are already part of 
another cluster, they merely forward such advertisements to 
their own security agent. The two security agents then 
authenticate each other, with the aim of merging the two 
clusters into one. Cluster merging is the process whereby two 
clusters of the same PN (within each other’s transmission 
range) merge to form one cluster. Using IEEE 802.1X based 
port authentication allows two clusters to merge when their 
periphery overlaps and not only when the transmission range of 
the two security agents overlap. For more details refer to [3] 
[23]. 
Merging the two clusters will allow devices from one 
cluster to access resources in the other cluster directly, instead 
of going through respective gateways. However before clusters 
can be merged, they need to have a common cluster key and 
security agent. Therefore during authentication one of the 
security agents will step down after updating the cluster key, 
                                                          
1 Depending on cluster policy and device’s routing capabilities 
cluster policy etc. of its cluster with that of the cluster being 
merged with. 
In terms of security agent functionality, Security Agent 
Capable (SAC) devices have the capabilities to function as 
security agents whereas Security Agent In-capable (SAI) 
devices do not. SAI devices such as sensors are less 
sophisticated and typically only useful when networked with 
other smarter devices in a cluster. 
C. Securing Cluster Communication 
As PN constituents share a common trust, we use group 
authentication to improve system efficiency. Using a shared 
group key, henceforth called the cluster key, to verify cluster 
membership instead of as many keys as members in the cluster 
reduces the overhead associated with key management. 
Consequently clustered device can verify that messages were 
generated by trusted devices and not modified in transit by any 
un-trusted devices. As a result, any invalid packet injected by 
an adversary will be dropped. 
Clustered devices append a MAC (message authentication 
code) calculated using the key Kmac to all intra-cluster traffic 
that they generate. Kmac is generated from the cluster key using 
a globally known one way hash function. This is because the 
existing cluster key is used to encrypt the next cluster key 
during key update, so we limit its further direct use in order to 
minimize exposure to attack. Appending a MAC increases the 
communication overhead so it should not be overly 
conservative.  Although depending on the bandwidth of the 
links and the cluster key validity period, we assume a MAC 
size of 4 bytes [5] to be sufficient. This is also the value used in 
our simulations. 
Optionally, devices may encrypt sensitive messages at the 
link layer by using an encryption key (Kencr). Similarly to Kmac, 
the encryption key is also derived from the cluster key using a 
globally known one-way transformation. By default, cluster 
advertisements are not encrypted but only appended with a 
MAC (unless a cluster wishes to stay anonymous and 
undiscoverable). 
Lastly, we would like to point out that although evaluating 
the cryptographic algorithms for securing communication 
amongst constrained devices is important, it is not a part of our 
research because a lot of research has already been done in this 
area in the context of (resource constrained) sensor networks 
[15] [5]. 
D. Bootstrapping Cluster Formation 
When an SAC device powers up it starts functioning as 
security agents in a cluster that only contains itself. As a 
security agent it will periodically broadcast cluster 
advertisements. On the other hand, SAI devices unable to 
create their own clusters start out in the orphan state. Devices 
in the orphan state do not belong to any cluster so do not have a 
cluster key. Such devices only know their PN ID, which was 
configured during the imprinting process. 
SAI devices attempt to authenticate with the first cluster of 
their own PN whose advertisement they receive. After a 
successful authentication they are able to join that cluster and 
take part in intra-cluster communication. Similarly, two 
clusters within each other’s transmission range merge to form 
one cluster. As a result, co-located personal devices will 
systematically group themselves into a single cluster. 
V. SELF ORGANIZATION 
We have said that devices listen for cluster advertisements 
in order to discover clusters within their transmission range. 
Cluster members use such advertisements to monitor the state 
of their security agent. We define a live cluster as one that has 
a functioning security agent and can grow by adding new 
members. A zombie cluster has lost its security agent, 
however communication between existing cluster members is 
still possible until the cluster key expires. 
 
 
Figure 2.  State transitions of PN devices  
Figure 2 shows the state transitions of PN devices. We see 
that SAI devices start out in the orphan state, whereas SAC 
devices start out in the security agent state. After authenticating 
with an existing cluster, devices in the orphan state enter the 
clustered state {1} as members of the expanded cluster. When 
two clusters merge, one of the security agents will enter the 
merging state {6} where it will update the cluster key etc. of its 
own cluster to that of the cluster being merging with. The other 
security agent will then become the security agent of the two 
merged clusters {7}. 
We define the redundancy factor ‘i’ as the number of 
sequential cluster advertisements missed by a device before it 
believes it has lost connectivity with the security agent. 
Therefore if a clustered device misses ‘i’ consecutive cluster 
advertisements, it enters the transition state {2, 9}. Without 
the security agent, the existing cluster key will eventually 
expire and devices can no longer communicate among 
themselves. SAI devices enter the orphan state {4} where they 
wait indefinitely to join another cluster while SAC devices 
form their own clusters {11}.  
For SAI devices the duration of the transition state is 
limited by the time remaining till the existing cluster key 
expires. While this key is valid, SAI devices can continue 
taking part in intra-cluster communication. However if they 
hear an advertisement from another cluster belonging to their 
PN, they will attempt to join that cluster instead {3}. If they do 
not hear any cluster advertisements at all, they remain part of 
the existing zombie cluster till the current key timeouts and the 
cluster falls apart {4}. 
SAC devices being less dependent can leave the transition 
state sooner and create their own clusters {11}, which other 
devices can then join. The transitions {5,12} show devices 
moving from the clustered state to the orphan and security 
agent states without going through the transition state. Such a 
device was in the transition state during the re-key or the hash 
disclosure phase, but later received one or more cluster 
advertisements so moved back to the clustered state before its 
cluster key expired. Finally, since devices only enter the 
transition state when they no longer hear cluster advertisements 
from their security agent they automatically stop advertising 
their cluster during this blackout period. In this way the system 
is quite self regulating. 
VI. OVERVIEW OF OUR SECURITY MODEL 
Reference [9] lists the traditional models used to offer 
security services to members of a long term ad-hoc community, 
such as a PN. Since no one model is suitable on its own, our 
security framework utilized three of them. In the pre-shared 
common data model each member of the community knows a 
shared secret. In our proposal, all personal devices belonging to 
a cluster use a symmetric group key, known as the cluster key, 
for securing intra-cluster communication. In the pre-shared 
derived data model each community member can be uniquely 
identified by a seed derived for it by another entity. We use 
tickets created by a trusted third party to uniquely authenticate 
personal devices to a cluster, before they are given the cluster 
key. Lastly, the resurrecting duckling model [7] ensures the 
security of a transient association between a master (mother) 
and a slave (duckling) device, in the absence of an online 
authentication server. This secure association it built when the 
master device imprints the slave by transferring a secret key 
using physical contact (to ensure the authenticity and 
confidentiality of information).  Although an imprinted device 
is controlled by the mother, it is free to interact with other 
devices. A device in the imprinted state remains linked to its 
mother till the latter breaks the relation between them, at which 
point it enters the imprintable state again. Predictably, a device 
in the imprinted state cannot be re-imprinted. In the following 
segment we justify how these models fit in the context of PNs. 
In general, use of the pre-shared common data model is 
often rejected (in spite of having the lowest storage cost and 
being very energy efficient) because compromise of a single 
device reveals the shared key. However, we believe that using a 
shared key for securing PN clusters is feasible because of: 
• The transient nature of the cluster and its cluster key. 
Consequently the effects of key compromise only last 
as long as the compromised cluster is intact. Unlike 
proposals using the group key as a fixed globally 
shared key [18], the cluster key is time-limited and 
cluster-limited. 
• The reduce risk of key compromise from cryptanalysis 
because of periodic cluster key updates. 
• The reduced risk of key compromise from 
compromised devices because the loss or theft of a 
personal device is generally easier to detect when 
compared to large-scale unattended sensor networks. 
• Alternatives to a shared cluster key would be pair-wise 
or sub-group keys, both of which increase the overhead 
of key management, storage and communication 
(because of repeated decryption and re-encryption for 
packets traveling multiple hops). 
The use of the pre-shared derived data model is also often 
rejected because its online-verifiable mechanisms (like 
Kerberos) require an online entity issuing the ticket at the time 
of communication. The dynamic nature of PNs means that 
communication with such an entity cannot be guaranteed. On 
the other hand, the off-line verifiable mechanisms are 
traditionally based on using certificates signed by the public 
key of the central authority. We have already rejected using 
asymmetric cryptography due to the constrained nature of some 
personal devices. Our proposal is therefore to use an offline 
verifiable mechanism based on symmetric key 
cryptography i.e. something like an offline Kerberos. For 
most networks this would not be a feasible proposal because 
unlike certificates, a ticket is only valid for authenticating with 
a specific device. Meaning that in a network where a device 
may wish to authenticate with any other device, it will have to 
be loaded with as many tickets as there are devices in the 
network. Even though we do not envision a PN to contain more 
than a (few) hundred devices, clearly this is still not a feasible 
option for constrained devices. In Section VII.A.1 we look at 
why our architecture only requires constrained devices to load 
a small number of tickets to ensure secure connectivity. For 
clarification, a scheme based on tickets is quite different from 
pre-distributing pair-wise keys because the latter does not 
easily allow new devices to be added to a pre-existing network 
since existing devices will not have the new devices’ keys. 
We use the resurrecting duckling model and make one 
device (called the security manager) the mother to all other 
personal devices. Although personal devices typically have 
long term associations with their owners, this relationship on 
occasion needs to be severed e.g. when a device is sold or gets 
lost. In addition to this, the user centric concept of PNs suits 
having the security manager, as the cyber-representative of the 
user, in complete control of all personal devices. In [8] Stajano 
extends the original model by proposing the use of security 
policies to handle more than one-to-one relations. This allows 
the security manager to control the behavior of a device by 
uploading different policies to it, for example, specifying the 
list of devices allowed to access a certain service.  
VII. SECURITY MECHANISMS IN DETAIL 
Being part of a PN allows devices seamless access to the 
common pool of PN resources. However before a new (i.e. 
imprintable) device can become part of a PN, a series of steps 
must be carried out to securely transfer the necessary 
credentials to access the PN. The remainder of this section 
looks at each of these steps in detail. 
A. Imprinting 
The first step in making a new device part of a user’s PN is 
imprinting that device with the security manager of the PN. 
The major problem with symmetric key based schemes is to 
establish a secret key between two un-associated devices, 
without making use of asymmetric key cryptography such as 
Diffie-Hellman. Stajano and Anderson [7] propose a solution 
that uses physical contact to transfer the symmetric key in plain 
text.  This is later formalized by Balfanz et al in [20] as a 
location-limited side channel that ensures the secrecy of 
communication. Location-limited side channels are separate 
from the main wireless link, and have the security properties of 
demonstrative identification and authenticity. This is by virtue 
of the medium over which the data travels, for example, 
directional channels such as infrared. Unfortunately all devices, 
especially the more constrained variety like Bluetooth headsets, 
do not generally come with suitable location-limited side 
channels over which the security manager can “push” the 
symmetric key in plain text. 
Therefore we propose a new mechanism, in which the 
device to be imprinted pushes an initialization  key to the 
security manager, which in turn uses it to securely transfer the 
long term key to the device being imprinted. To support our 
proposal we use as an example a sensor that comes from the 
factory pre-configured with an initialization key. The user 
would have access to this key in the form of a string of text, an 
RF ID or a bar code that comes in the box. During imprinting 
this initialization key is pushed to the security manager with 
user assistance, for example, the user takes a picture of the bar 
code with the built camera of his security manager. From this 
bar code the security manager can automatically extract the 
initialization key and the MAC address of the new device. 
Now, at any time in the future the security manager can 
authenticate itself to, and securely imprint the sensor over the 
insecure wireless channel. We do not use the actual pre-
configured key of the sensor as the long term key with the 
security manager, because the user would like such keys to be 
secret even from the manufacturer of the device. 
Such a mechanism, which does not require the user to 
position the security manager and the device to be imprinted 
according to the requirements of the location-limited side 
channel, is even more useful when imprinting a large amount 
of sensors. Imagine a scenario where a user buys a house, 
which has been pre-deployed with a large amount of sensors. 
He could be given a list of bar codes corresponding to the 
deployed sensors and only needs to scan the bar codes with his 
security manager. The remainder of the imprinting process, 
where the security manager needs to transfer the necessary 
credentials, will be done automatically over the insecure 
wireless link as the user walks around the house. The same 
benefit would apply if he were to buy a large quantity of 
sensors from the store. In Section VII.A.2 we give details on 
the protocol specification of our proposed imprinting 
mechanism. 
Then again, the heterogeneity of devices in a PN means that 
other personal devices have multiple interfaces available for 
imprinting. We therefore generalize our example of the sensor 
to include more capable devices. If the device to be imprinted 
has an interface where a secret key can be pushed, then either 
the security manager pushes the long term key to the device or 
the device pushes an initialization key to the security manager. 
However if the device to be imprinted does not have a suitable 
interface to receive the long term key (our example of the 
sensor) then the only option is to push an initialization key to 
the security manager. Devices with suitable interfaces can 
generate the initialization keys dynamically; others will come 
with a factory configured initialization key. Dynamically 
generated initialization keys are discarded after the imprinting 
process completes. The static keys should be kept secure since 
they are used if the corresponding device ever needs to be 
imprinted again.  
At the end of the imprinting phase we have a trust model 
shaped like a star, with the security manager at the center. 
However since personal devices also need to communicate 
with each other, this model as it stands, in not enough. 
1) Tickets 
Our selected approach for enabling mutual authentication 
between two previously un-associated personal devices is built 
on third party referral and uses as its basis the Needham-
Schroeder protocol [21]. This protocol is based on symmetric 
cryptographic primitives and uses tickets to prove the identity 
of authenticating devices. The trusted third party responsible 
for issuing these tickets is the security manager. It is able to 
issue such tickets because it maintains a database of secret 
keys, one for each device belonging to the PN. Consistent with 
[22] we call such a paradigm a Personal TGS (i.e. a personal 
ticket granting server). In terms of characteristics, a Personal 
TGS is different from that proposed by Needham-Schroeder 
(Appendix 1) and extended in Kerberos.  
Personal devices are pre-loaded with all necessary tickets 
during the imprinting phase and under normal circumstances 
will never contact the security manager for more tickets. Each 
ticket (valid indefinitely) is only used once, as the resulting key 
is considered long term and will be used for future 
authentications. In order to keep the storage overhead low, 
devices are only loaded with tickets needed to form clusters 
and the tunnels that interconnect different clusters. In other 
words, resource constrained SAI devices are only loaded with 
tickets needed to authenticate with SAC devices (for joining 
clusters). Since only a fraction of devices in a typical Personal 
Network will be SAC, this significantly reduces the storage 
overhead for constrained devices. This optimization is based on 
our assumption that SAI devices being less sophisticated (e.g. 
without suitable user interfaces) are not useful by themselves 
but only when networked with other smarter devices in a 
cluster. Once part of a cluster they can communicate securely 
with fellow cluster members using the cluster key and members 
of remote clusters through their cluster gateway. 
SAC devices will of course need tickets for all other 
devices in the PN. This is because SAC devices, when 
functioning as security agents, should be able to authenticate all 
SAI devices joining their cluster and also other SAC devices 
during cluster merges. However we do not consider this a 
weakness because SAC devices like PDAs and cellular phones 
are not resource constrained and have sufficient storage 
capabilities. Finally, personal devices capable of functioning as 
gateways will need tickets corresponding to other PN 
gateways. This is because inter-cluster communication is 
secured by creating cryptographic tunnels between gateways. 
Next we present the protocol specification for our proposed 
mechanism, divided into two phases. Phase 1 is pre-imprinting 
and requires user assistance. Phase 2 is the actual imprinting 
process during which all relevant information is transferred to 
the new device. Note that phase 2 can take place any time in 
the future after phase 1.  
2) Protocol Specification - Imprinting 
Device B is new SAI device being introduced into a 
Personal Network that contains a SAC device (A), and a 
security manager (M). 
 
MACB : MAC address of B 
Kinit : Initialization key 
IDB : Device ID of B 
NB : Nonce generated by B 
dec : Decrement operation 
hash : One-way hash operation 
CB : List of B’s capabilities  
  (I.e. SAC, SAI, GW) 
PB : Policy to be used by B  
KBM : Long term key between B and M 
PNID : Personal Network ID 
 
Phase 1 (User assisted over a secure channel) 
 
1. B -> M: MACB, Kinit  
 
Phase 2 (Insecure main wireless channel) 
 
2. M->B: {IDM, NM} Kinit, hash(IDM) 
3. B->M: {dec(NM), NB, CB} Kinit 
4. M->B: {dec(NB), IDB, PB ,KBM, PNID}Kinit, 
    {IDB, KAB} KAM, {IDA, KAB} KBM 
The first step is performed by the user when he loads the 
security manager with the MAC address and initialization key 
of the new device. In step 2, the security manager sends its ID 
and a challenge, protected by the initialization key, to device B. 
In Section VIII we explain why sending a hash of already 
encrypted information protects device B from denial of service 
attacks. In step 3 device B responds to the challenge, and sends 
one of its own (for mutual authentication). It also sends a list of 
capabilities, based on which, in step 4 the security manager 
transfers relevant tickets. In the example given the security 
manager is only transferring one ticket, for device A. Besides 
tickets the security manager also imprints device B with its new 
ID, policy, long term pair-wise key and the PN ID. 
B. Authentication 
Earlier we said that access to the cluster, hence the cluster 
key, is only granted to devices after they successfully 
authenticate with the security agent. The very first 
authentication between a devices and a security agent utilizes 
the tickets transferred during the imprinting phase. A 
successful authentication will result in a security association 
based on the resultant long term key. Therefore once used, a 
ticket is destroyed since any future authentication will instead 
use the existing security association. Depending on the order 
that the two authenticating devices were added to the PN, either 
of them can be holding the relevant ticket. Next we present the 
protocol specification for both cases. Since cluster 
advertisements include the ID of the security agent, 
authenticating devices know which of the two mechanisms to 
use. 
1) Protocol Specification - Authentication 
Example 1: Device B begins authentication with device A 
after receiving its cluster advertisement i.e. the ticket is with 
the authenticating device. 
1. B -> A: {IDB, KAB} KAM, {NB, hash(IDB)}KAB 
2. A -> B: {dec(NB), NA} KAB 
3. B -> A: {dec(NA)} KAB 
4. A -> B: {cluster key,…} KAB 
Example 2: Later a new SAC device, C, is added to the 
Personal Network. Device B is un-clustered and begins 
authentication with device C after receiving its cluster 
advertisement i.e. the ticket is with the authenticator. Device B 
knows that it can authenticate with device C because the cluster 
advertisement has the same PN ID. 
1. B -> C: IDB 
2. C -> B: {IDC, KBC} KBM, {NC} KBC 
3. B -> C: {dec(NC), NB} KBC 
4. C -> B: {dec(NB)}KAB, {cluster key,…}KAB 
Depending on the final implementation the security agent 
may transfer a number of organizational parameters in step 4. 
These include but are not limited to the, cluster key, cluster key 
validity period, cluster policy and a commitment of the key 
chain of the security agent (Section D).  
C. Personal TGS 
For a more inclusive explanation of a Personal TGS, we 
compare it to the Needham Schroeder protocol and it’s most 
well known and featured derivative, Kerberos. We assume that 
the reader is familiar with both of them. When comparing with 
the Needham Schroeder protocol, we do not use “NA” in step 1 
and 2 of Appendix 1. This is because the keys generated by the 
Needham Schroeder protocol are session keys that need to be 
periodically refreshed; in our case they are long term keys used 
for authentication. The nonce is meant to protect against replay 
attacks where an attacker replays step 2 with the old session 
key in order to increase the amount of cryptographic material 
available to him. We think it is appropriate to use tickets to 
generate long term keys because personal devices have a long 
term membership in the PN and the flexibility to authorize 
access to a service temporarily is not necessary. Also since the 
keys generated are long term, Dorothy Denning and Giovanni 
Sacco’s recommendations [24] about time stamps in the 
Needham Schroeder protocol are not necessary. 
In Appendix 1 we see that B is authenticating A, but not 
vice versa. Therefore we use an extra nonce when the ticket is 
first sent to the authenticator (step 3, Appendix 1), to ensure 
mutual authentication. When comparing with Kerberos which 
uses timestamps for authentication, our protocol uses tickets 
that are valid indefinitely and authenticates using a challenge 
response mechanism. This also has an advantage of not 
requiring PAN devices to be time synchronized with each other 
and the TGS. 
The main disadvantage of our protocol is the difficulty of 
performing timely revocation in the absence of an online TGS. 
As such our protocol has something in common with public 
key cryptography and signed certificates and solutions 
proposed for them can be applied. If the security manager is not 
always online but is nevertheless online at frequent intervals, 
we can use routinely distributed revocation lists. In this 
approach the security manager distributes updated revocation 
lists at regular intervals to all personal devices. Due to the long 
term relationship of devices within a PN revocation will only 
be needed in cases where a personal device is lost, sold or 
compromised. 
The proposed scheme based on establishing trust using 
tickets issued by the security manager is supported by all 
personal devices. Optionally, more powerful devices can also 
use asymmetric cryptography by asking the security manager 
to issue them with digital certificates. These certificates can be 
used for added security by protecting communication at higher 
layers.  Similar to tickets, certificates should also be issued by 
the security manager during imprinting. 
D. Updating the cluster key 
Updating the cluster key (or re-key) is performed when the 
current cluster key is about to expire, when the user wants to 
expel a device from the cluster or when one cluster has to 
update its key to that of another cluster during cluster merging. 
Even though all cluster traffic is protected using the cluster 
key, we feel control messages such as re-key messages and 
cluster advertisements require an additional level of security.  
Otherwise misbehaving clustered devices or compromised 
cluster keys can be used to hijack the cluster. Consequently 
control messages broadcasted by the security agent are further 
protected using TESLA [10]. This way they cannot be forged 
by unauthorized devices. We employ TESLA for broadcast 
authentication because it is based on lightweight symmetric 
cryptography and is tolerant to packet loss. 
In Section II.A we stated that TESLA requires each device 
to be time synchronized with the sender, perform key 
management functions and have sufficient buffer capacity. 
Since we are only securing control messages transmitted by the 
security agent we ensure loose time synchronization by having 
devices synchronize with the security agent during 
authentication. If there are issues of clock synchronization, we 
can utilize the periodic properties of cluster advertisements by 
using them as time synchronization beacons. Furthermore only 
securing control messages means that the number of messages 
being authenticated in each time period is very small and 
receivers do not need excessive buffer capacities. In order to 
reduce the energy overhead of cluster wide broadcasts we 
piggyback re-key messages, disclosed TESLA keys and other 
messages related to TESLA’s key management on the 
periodically broadcasted cluster advertisements. Not only does 
this reduce the transmission overhead but it also reduces the 
number of times devices need to wake up from sleep state. 
Consequently we use a TESLA period that is equal to one 
cluster advertisement period. This also has the advantage that 
we only need to optimize for one parameter instead of two.  
In order to piggyback messages on top of cluster 
advertisements we define certain extension headers [23]. The 
entire cluster advertisement including the extension headers is 
protected by a MAC generated using the cluster key and 
another (known as MAC-H) using TESLA. This is because 
MAC-H can only be verified in the next TESLA interval and 
the MAC derived from the cluster key ensures that attackers 
who do not know the cluster key cannot inject false cluster 
advertisements.  
The unreliable nature of wireless transmission coupled with 
the fact that we employ broadcasts for efficiency reasons, 
means that we need a mechanism to ensure the reliable 
distribution of re-key messages. Figure 3 illustrates our 
proposed re-key mechanism where re-keying starts with the 
cluster advertisement (with the re-key extension header) of 
sequence number ‘x’. As per our earlier definition of the 
redundancy factor, any device that is part of the cluster should 
receive at least one of ‘i’ sequential cluster advertisements. 
Consequently, in order to ensure the reliable delivery of re-key 
information we repeat it within ‘i’ consecutive cluster 
advertisements. In [23] we use simulation results to justify a 
value for ‘i’. Once devices have verified that the new key is 
genuine, they are ready to switch over. However this should be 
done in a way that no ongoing communication is disrupted.  
 
Figure 3.  The re-key mechanism 
Each re-key message contains the next cluster key 
(encrypted using the existing cluster key), the validity period of 
the new key and the update sequence number. The update 
sequence number field of the re-key message holds the 
sequence number of the cluster advertisement which signals the 
switch over to the new cluster key. This is the cluster 
advertisement enclosing the disclosed key corresponding to the 
last re-key message. Devices switch over to the verified cluster 
key immediately after forwarding the cluster advertisement 
with the update sequence number. However due to the 
unreliability of the medium there is a possibility that some 
devices will not receive this cluster advertisement. 
Consequently we have two backup mechanisms to switch over 
to the new cluster key. The first mechanism estimates the time 
in the future at which the cluster advertisement with the update 
sequence number should arrive. This is calculated based on the 
cluster advertisement period and the sequence number of the 
last verified re-key message. If devices exceed the estimated 
time plus one cluster advertisement period (to ensure that the 
message was indeed lost and not delayed), they update their 
cluster key automatically. This timer, called the key switch 
timer is automatically cancelled if the cluster key is updated 
using other mechanisms. Secondly, if a device waiting for the 
cluster advertisement with the update sequence number 
receives a message protected with the new cluster key it 
updates its cluster key as well. This is because it assumes that 
the sending device must have received the cluster 
advertisement with the update sequence number, otherwise it 
would not have shifted to the new key. This mechanism is not 
enabled when devices are re-keying as a result of cluster 
merging because other devices are already using the new 
cluster key. Lastly, since the system will not synchronize 
immediately there will be situations where some devices are 
using the old cluster key and others the new one. During the 
old key validity phase devices that have changed to the new 
key also accept packets that are signed with the old key. 
However any packets that they themselves transmit are signed 
with the new key. The old key valid phase lasts till the 
expected arrival of cluster advertisement with update sequence 
number + 2 cluster advertisement periods. 
E. Device eviction 
Devices are evicted from the cluster by excluding them 
from cluster key updates. Since foreign devices only have 
access to Kmac and not the cluster key from which it is derived, 
they are evicted by simply updating the cluster key. Personal 
devices are expected to have long term associations with the 
PN, so our proposed re-key mechanism does not have a way to 
evict personal devices besides blacklisting the excluded device 
and reforming the cluster. If evicting personal devices will be 
done frequently, we propose modifying our re-key mechanism 
to use GKMPAN [14].  GKMPAN is based on probabilistic 
key pre-deployment and also uses TESLA for secure 
broadcasting. However it allows us to evict selected personal 
devices during re-keying. Nevertheless, given that we only 
expect personal devices to be evicted rarely, we do not propose 
it as the default mechanism. This is due to increased overhead 
from storing the extra set of keys, increased transmission 
overhead and the fact that it requires a multicast delivery tree 
to distribute the new group key. GKMPAN was designed for 
multicast groups where such trees already exist.  
VIII. ATTACKS 
In general, attackers are classified into two main classes, 
passive and active. Passive attackers only eavesdrop on the 
communication thus they are a threat against the confidentiality 
and the anonymity of the communication. Confidentiality for 
PN traffic can be assured via optional link level encryption 
using Kencr. A compromised Kencr only compromises the 
confidentiality of the current session. On the other hand if the 
actual cluster key gets compromised, usually as a result of 
device compromise, then the confidentiality of all future cluster 
traffic is compromised. This will require revoking the 
compromised device and reforming the cluster. For 
clarification, we believe sensitive information such as credit 
card numbers are usually already protected at higher layers, e.g. 
using TLS. 
Anonymity is assured if devices belonging to the user do 
not expose their identity or something that can be linked to 
their identity to un-trusted parties. Providing anonymity for the 
users of PNs requires: 
• Using encrypted cluster advertisements:  Broadcasting 
of clear text PN ID in cluster advertisement is no 
longer possible. The user can stay anonymous and 
undiscoverable by temporarily encrypting cluster 
advertisements. This has the automatic effect of 
stopping any authentication attempts in which devices 
transmit their IDs in clear text (Section VII.B.1 
example 2). 
• Using dynamic MAC addresses: Since authentication is 
based on device IDs, devices can change their MAC 
addresses if necessary. However this creates overhead 
in the system as it requires periodic updates of the ARP 
cache and checking for potential MAC address 
collision before each update. 
Clearly, providing anonymity affects performance and 
possibly even usability. Consequently our proposed 
mechanisms do not provide anonymity as default. 
An active attacker not only eavesdrops on the 
communication but also modifies and injects packets into the 
network. An active attack against the imprinting phase is not 
possible because the attacker does not have access to the 
initialization key (assuming phase 1 was performed securely). 
Similarly, since all link layer communication is protected with 
a MAC created using Kmac, attackers cannot become active 
unless they have compromised this key. For this reason Kmac is 
regularly updated and the system has forward security since a 
compromised Kmac does not compromise the next Kmac.  
Nevertheless if Kmac is compromised while it is still being used, 
the cluster becomes open to certain kinds of attacks, for 
example those against the ad hoc routing algorithm [25] and 
resource consumption attacks on TESLA [10]. 
Without compromised keys the attacker can only launch 
denial of service (DoS) attacks. We disregard physical layer 
attacks based on jamming because mechanisms such as spread 
spectrum have already been extensively studied to resist such 
attacks. DoS attacks against computational resources can be 
performed by fake authentication attempts as well as injecting 
messages into the cluster that will fail the integrity check. Our 
aim is to reduce harm from such DoS attacks by limiting their 
energy imprint. As transmission uses the lion’s share of energy, 
we want to reduce wasteful transmissions triggered by attacks. 
Therefore in the imprinting process (step 2) we also transmit a 
hash of IDM in clear text. This allows device B to confirm that 
the device M knows its initializing key before it transmits any 
replies (as IDM is also sent encrypted with the initialization 
key). Similarly in Section VII.B.1 example 1, step 1, we also 
send a hash of IDB encrypted using KAB. We are unable to use 
this mechanism against DoS attacks against the security agent, 
Section VII.B.1 example 2, because the device initiating the 
message exchange does not hold the ticket. However the 
attacker will have to correctly guess the ID of a device that has 
a valid ticket at the security agent. In case the security agent 
has a time limit before a failed authentication attempt can be 
repeated, the attacker will need to guess multiple valid IDs to 
launch any meaningful attack. Finally, replay attacks are not 
possible because both imprinting and authentication between 
two given devices using tokens is only performed once.  
IX. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have proposed a framework for secure 
clustering in Personal Networks. Our aim was to protect the 
Personal Network while maintaining its usability. Based on our 
constraints we have selected appropriate security models and 
presented details on our mechanism for key management and 
self organization. We proposed a novel way of imprinting 
devices and pre-deploying tickets which are later used for 
authentication. Consistent with our requirements all our 
proposed mechanisms are based on light symmetric 
cryptography and are applicable to a wide variety of devices.  
Furthermore our design minimizes the transmission overhead 
of adding security by reducing the number of messages that 
need to be exchanged. In [23] we have validated the 
transmission cost of our proposed mechanisms by simulations 
in NS-2 [19]. Although our work is done in the context of 
Personal Networks, our proposals are relevant to other models 
[27] [28] in which constrained personal devices are networked 
over unreliable wireless links. 
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Appendix 1: Protocol specification Needham 
Schroeder Symmetric Key 
 
Alice (A) authenticates herself to Bob (B) using a mutually 
trusted server M. 
 
NA, NB  :   Nonce  
KAM, KBM, KAB  :   Session key  
dec   :   Decrement operation  
 
1. A -> M: A, B, NA  
2. M -> A: {NA, B, KAB, {KAB, A}KBM}KAM  
3. A -> B: {KAB, A}KBM  
4. B -> A: {NB}KAB  
5. A -> B: {dec(NB)}KAB 
 
